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Abstract
We prove that a random choice rule satisfies Luce’s Choice Axiom if
and only if its support —the set of alternatives that can be chosen— is a
choice correspondence that satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence, and random choice occurs according to a stochastic tie breaking
among optimizers that satisfies Renyi’s Conditioning Axiom.
Our result shows that the Choice Axiom is, in a precise formal sense,
a probabilistic version of the Weak Axiom. It thus supports Luce’s view
of his own axiom as a “canon of probabilistic rationality.”
∗Part of the material of this paper was first circulated in 2016 as IGIER WP 593.
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1 Introduction
In 1977, twenty years after proposing it, Duncan Luce commented as follows
about his celebrated Choice Axiom:1
“Perhaps the greatest strength of the choice axiom, and one reason
it continues to be used, is as a canon of probabilistic rationality. It is
a natural probabilistic formulation of K. J. Arrow’s famed principle
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and as such it is a
possible underpinning for rational, probabilistic theories of social
behavior.”
This claim already appears in his 1957 and 1959 works that popularized the
axiom and the resulting stochastic choice model.2 The conceptual proximity of
Arrow’s principle, typically identified with the set-theoretic version of theWeak
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP),3 and Luce’s Choice Axiom is indeed
often invoked. As well-known, the former plays a key role in deterministic
choice theory, the latter in stochastic choice theory.
Yet, the formal relation between these two independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives (IIA) assumptions has remained elusive so far.4 For instance, in
analyzing several different IIA axioms Ray (1973) writes:
“Obviously IIA (Luce) falls in a different category altogether [rel-
ative to IIA (Arrow)], being concerned with probabilistic choices.”
This note provides the missing link by showing that a random choice rule
satisfies Luce’s Choice Axiom if and only if:
1. its support, the set of alternatives that can be chosen, is a rational choice
correspondence a la Arrow (1948, 1959), so it consists of alternatives that
are optimal according to some preference;
2. tie-breaking among the optimal alternatives is consistent in the sense of
conditional probability a la Renyi (1955, 1956).
1Luce (1977, p. 229), emphasis added.
2See Luce (1957, p. 6) and Luce (1959, p. 9).
3Arrow himself put forth this version of Samuelson’s WARP in his 1948 and 1959 works.
4See the discussion of Peters and Wakker (1991, p. 1789) and Wakker (2010, p. 373).
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In this way, our analysis formally supports Luce’s “canonical rationality”
claim for his Choice Axiom via a lexicographic composition of two standard
concepts of rationality: deterministic rationality (WARP) and stochastic con-
sistency (Renyi’s Conditioning Axiom).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Random choice rules
Let A be the collection of all non-empty finite subsets of a universal set X of
possible alternatives. The elements of A are called choice sets and denoted by
A, B and C.
A map Γ : A → A such that Γ (A) ⊆ A for all choice sets A is called choice
correspondence. It is rational when
B ⊆ A and Γ (A) ∩B 6= ∅ =⇒ Γ (B) = Γ (A) ∩B (WARP)
This is the set-theoretic form of WARP considered by Arrow (1948, 1959). Its
IIA nature is best seen when Γ is a function:
B ⊆ A and Γ (A) ∈ B =⇒ Γ (B) = Γ (A)
In words, adding suboptimal alternatives is irrelevant for choice behavior.
We denote by ∆ (X) the set of all finitely supported probability measures
on X and, for each A ⊆ X , by ∆ (A) the subset of ∆ (X) consisting of the
measures assigning mass 1 to A.
Definition 1 A random choice rule is a function
p : A → ∆(X)
A 7→ pA
such that pA ∈ ∆(A) for all A ∈ A.
Given any alternative a ∈ A, we interpret pA ({a}), also denoted by p (a, A),
as the probability that an agent chooses a when the set of available alternatives
is A. More generally, if B is a subset of A, we denote by pA (B) or p (B,A)
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the probability that the selected element lies in B.5 This probability can be
viewed as the frequency with which an element in B is chosen. In particular,
the set of alternatives that can be chosen from A is the support of pA, given by
supp pA = {a ∈ X : p (a, A) > 0}
The assumption pA (A) = 1 guarantees that it is a non-empty subset of A, so
that the support correspondence
supp p : A → A
A 7→ supp pA
is a choice correspondence.
Finally, the standard way of comparing the probabilities of choices in two
different sets B and C are the odds in favor of B over C, that is,
rA (B,C) =
pA (B)
pA (C)
=
# of times an element in B is chosen
# of times an element in C is chosen
for all B,C ⊆ A. As usual, given any b and c in X , we set p (b, c) = p (b, {b, c})
and
r (b, c) =
p (b, c)
p (c, b)
2.2 Luce’s model
The classical assumptions of Luce (1959) on p are:
Positivity p (a, b) > 0 for all a, b ∈ X.
Choice Axiom p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (B,A) for all B ⊆ A in A and all a ∈ B.
The latter axiom says that the probability of choosing an alternative a
from the choice set A is the probability of first selecting B from A, then
choosing a from B (provided a belongs to B). As observed by Luce, formally
this assumption corresponds to the fact that {pA : A ∈ A} is a conditional
probability system in the sense of Renyi (1955, 1956).6 Remarkably, Luce’s
Choice Axiom is also equivalent to:
5Formally, x 7→ p (x,A) for all x ∈ X is the discrete density of pA, but with an abuse of
notation pA (·) is identified with p (·, A); we also write pA (a) instead of pA ({a}).
6See Lemma 2 of Luce (1959) and Lemma 5 in the appendix.
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Odds Independence
p (a, b)
p (b, a)
=
p (a, A)
p (b, A)
(OI)
for all A ∈ A and all a, b ∈ A such that p (a, A) /p (b, A) is well defined.7
This axiom says that the odds for a against b are independent of the other
available alternatives.8
Theorem 1 (Luce) A random choice rule p : A → ∆(X) satisfies Positivity
and the Choice Axiom if and only if there exists α : X → R such that
p (a, A) =
eα(a)∑
b∈A e
α(b)
(LM)
for all A ∈ A and all a ∈ A.
This fundamental result in random choice theory also shows that, under
the Choice Axiom, Positivity is equivalent to the stronger assumption that pA
has full support for all choice sets A.
Full Support supp pA = A for all A ∈ A.
From a choice-theoretic perspective, this axiom is unduly restrictive and
may permit the choice of “dominated” actions. This note shows what happens
when removing from the Luce analysis this extra baggage.
Finally, when X is a separable metric space we may introduce a continuity
axiom.
Continuity Given any x, y ∈ X , if {xn}n∈N converges to x, then
p (xn, y) > 0 for all n ∈ N =⇒ p (x, y) > 0
p (y, xn) > 0 for all n ∈ N =⇒ p (y, x) > 0
This axiom has a natural interpretation: if xn can be always chosen (re-
jected) in the binary comparison with y, and xn converges to x, then x can be
chosen (rejected) in the binary comparison with y. Continuity is automatically
satisfied under Full Support as well as when X is countable and endowed with
the discrete metric.
7That is, different from 0/0. See Lemma 3 of Luce (1959) when Positivity holds and
Lemma 5 in the appendix for the general case.
8For this reason, also this axiom often goes under the IIA name. To avoid confusion, we
use a less popular label.
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3 Main result
The next result generalizes Luce’s Theorem 1 by getting rid of the Full Support
assumption.
Theorem 2 The following conditions are equivalent for a random choice rule
p : A → ∆(X):
(i) p satisfies the Choice Axiom;
(ii) there exist a function α : X → R and a rational choice correspondence
Γ : A → A such that
p (a, A) =


eα(a)∑
b∈Γ(A) e
α(b)
if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
(CA)
for all A ∈ A and all a ∈ A.
In this case, Γ is unique and given by Γ (A) = supp pA for all A ∈ A.
Since Γ is a rational choice correspondence, the relation ≻ defined by
a ≻ b ⇐⇒ a 6= b and Γ ({a, b}) = {a} ⇐⇒ b /∈ Γ ({a, b})
is a strict preference (see Kreps, 1988) and the corresponding weak preference
b % a ⇐⇒ a ⊁ b ⇐⇒ b ∈ Γ ({a, b}) ⇐⇒ p (b, a) > 0
is such that Γ (A) = {a ∈ A : a % b for all b ∈ A}.
When X is countable, % is automatically represented by a utility function
u and so we have
Γ (A) = argmax
A
u
In general, some additional conditions are needed, as next we show.
Proposition 3 If X is a separable metric space, then the random choice rule
p in Theorem 2 satisfies Continuity if and only if there exists a continuous
u : X → R such that Γ (A) = argmaxA u for all A ∈ A.
6
A two-stage decision process appears in formula (CA): first rational selec-
tion from the choice set A via maximization of preference % (or utility u), then
Lucean tie-breaking to choose among the optimal alternatives.
While the optimization structure of the first stage is clear, more can be
said about the tie-breaking structure of the second stage in that Theorem 2
describes only its functional form. To this end, recall that a random choice rule
p is based on a Random Preference Model if there is a (measurable) collection
{≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr)
of strict preferences such that, for all a ∈ A ∈ A,
p (a, A) = Pr (ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ω b ∀b ∈ A \ {a})
In particular, a Random Preference Model is Lucean if p (·, A) has the Luce
form (LM).
A piece of terminology: the lexicographic composition of two binary rela-
tions ≻ and ≻′ is the binary relation ≻ ◦ ≻′ defined by
a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b ⇐⇒ a ≻ b or a ∼ b and a ≻′ b
For instance, >1 ◦ >2 is the usual lexicographic preference on the Cartesian
plane.9
We can now state the announced characterization.
Proposition 4 The following conditions are equivalent for a random choice
rule p : A → ∆(X):
(i) p satisfies the Choice Axiom;
(ii) supp p : A → A is a rational choice correspondence and
pB (a) =
pA (a)
pA (B)
(COND)
for all B ⊆ A ∈ A and all a ∈ B ∩ supp pA.
(iii) there exist a strict preference ≻ on X and a Lucean Random Preference
Model {≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr) such that p is based on the Random Preference
Model {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr).
9Here >i is defined by (a1, a2) >i (b1, b2)⇐⇒ ai > bi.
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This result presents two “deconstructions” of the Choice Axiom that both
shed light on the second tie-breaking stage in (CA).
Specifically, to interpret (ii) observe that WARP says that, if a can be cho-
sen from A (i.e., pA (a) > 0) and belongs to B ⊆ A, then it can be chosen also
from B. But, this axiom is silent about the relation between the frequencies of
choice in the two sets A and B. Formula (COND) requires them to be related
by the Conditioning Axiom of Renyi (1955, 1956), a classical probabilistic con-
sistency condition. In particular, (COND) per se is weaker than Luce’s Choice
Axiom, which imposes pA (a) = pB (a) pA (B) for all a ∈ B ⊆ A, not just for
the elements a in B that can be chosen from A.
To interpret (iii), note that the first stage preference ≻ determines the
support of p, while the second stage Random Preference Model {≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr)
is the formal description of the Lucean tie-breaking among optimizers that we
previously discussed.
Finally, (iii) also says that, when X is countable, random choice rules that
satisfy the Choice Axiom are random utility models, something not obvious
from the definition. This opens the way to the study of general compositions of
strict preferences and random utility models. The object of current research,
a such study goes beyond the scope of this note.
4 Remarks
1. By considering a random choice rule pA to describe the frequency with
which elements are chosen from A, we make the standard interpretation
of the choice correspondence Γ (A) = supp pA as the the set of alterna-
tives that can be chosen from A (cf. Sen, 1993) operational and formally
meaningful. Here, “can be chosen” means chosen with positive frequency.
2. The second stage of randomization, disciplined by α, can be interpreted
in the spirit of Salant and Rubinstein (2008) as capturing observable
information which is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alter-
natives, but nonetheless affects choice and may reveal how previous ex-
periences and mental associations affect the selection from the optimal
Γ (A).
3. The distinct roles of u and α become clear once our result is related to the
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random utility representation of the Luce model. In fact, u corresponds
to the systematic component of the agent utility, and α to the alternative-
specific bias in the Multinomial Logit Model.10 Specifically, Theorem 2
shows that a random choice rule p has the form (CA) if and only if, given
any A ∈ A and any a ∈ A,
pA (a) = lim
λ→0
Pr (ω ∈ Ω : u (a) + λǫa (ω) > u (b) + λǫb (ω) ∀b ∈ A \ {a})
where u is a utility function that rationalizes Γ, {ǫx}x∈X is a collection of
independent errors with type I extreme value distribution, specific mean
α (a), common variance π2/6, and λ is the noise level.
In this setting, our analysis shows that, when noise vanishes, optimal
choice results and tie-breaking among optimal alternatives is stochasti-
cally driven by alternative-specific biases.
4. A similar interpretation arises when adopting the perspective of Matejika
and McKay (2015) on the Multinomial Logit Model as the outcome of
an optimal information acquisition problem. In this case, u is the true
(initially unknown) payoff of alternatives, α captures a prior belief on
payoffs held before engaging in experimentation, and λ is the cost of one
unit of information.
Here our analysis shows that, when the cost of information vanishes,
optimal alternatives are selected without error, and prior beliefs only
govern the tie-breaking among such alternatives.
5 Related literature
The study of the relations between axiomatic decision theory and stochastic
choice has been recently an active field of research. Horan (2020) and Ok
and Tserenjigmid (2020) are the most recent works that we are aware of.
The former also provides an insightful review of the state of the art. The
latter expands on the main conceptual topic of this note: the relation between
deterministic and probabilistic “rationality.”
10See the seminal McFadden (1973) as well as Ben Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train
(2009) for textbook treatments.
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Horan (2020) axiomatically unifies Luce (1956, 1959) in a random choice
model of imperfect discrimination of the form
p (a, A) =


eα(a)∑
b∈Γ(A) e
α(b)
if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
(GLM)
where Γ is a utility correspondence based on α. Specifically, in Horan, Γ
describes the degree of imperfection in the discrimination of the α-values of
alternatives; on the contrary, in this note α and Γ are independent, with the
former tie-breaking the optimizers identified by the latter.
Horan also compares and provides alternative axiomatizations of several
“General Luce Models” (the name is of Echenique and Saito, 2019) of the
form (GLM), which correspond to different specifications of the properties of
Γ: Ahumada and Ulku (2019), Dogan and Yildiz (2019), Echenique and Saito
(2019), Lindberg (2012), and McCausland (2009).
Among these works, the manuscript of Lindberg is the most related to the
present note.11 Like us, Lindberg investigates and characterizes the Choice
Axiom “in purity.” Differently from us, he does not obtain a representation
with a single (rational) choice function Γ and a single α, but rather focuses
on a lexicographic representation in the spirit of Renyi (1956). The main
overlap between this paper and Lindberg (2012) is the observation that, when
X is countable, random choice rules that satisfy the Choice Axiom are random
utility models.12 This result is stated without proof at the end of Lindberg
(2012) and appears in Horan (2020) as Lemma 11.
Dogan and Yildiz (2019) and Horan (2020) provide alternative character-
izations of (CA): the former based on supermodularity of odds, the latter on
the product rule and a transitivity condition of Fishburn (1978). These re-
sults —together with our characterizations of (CA) through the Choice Axiom
alone, or WARP and conditioning— provide a full perspective on “rational
choice” followed by “rational tie-breaking.”
Like us, Ok and Tserenjigmid (2020) regard the support of a random choice
rule as a deterministic choice correspondence, and they analyze its rationality
11We thank Sean Horan for this reference, which we learned after the first version of our
analysis circulated.
12That is, the sufficiency of (i) for (iii) in Proposition 4.
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properties for several different random choice rules. Following Fishburn (1978),
they also consider the entire family of deterministic choice correspondences
that lie between the support of p and its subset consisting of the alternatives
that are chosen with highest frequency (rather than with positive frequency).
6 Proofs
A preference on X can be given in either strict form, ≻, or weak form, %.
• In the first case, ≻ is required to be asymmetric and negatively transitive,
and % is defined by
a % b if and only if ¬ (b ≻ a) (1)
• In the second case, % is required to be complete and transitive, and ≻
is defined by
b ≻ a if and only if ¬ (a % b) (2)
These approaches are well known to be interchangeable,13 and for this
reason we call weak order both ≻ and % with the understanding that they are
related by the equivalent (1) or (2).
Lemma 5 Let p : A → ∆(X) be a random choice rule. The following condi-
tions are equivalent:
(i) p is such that, pA (C) = pB (C) pA (B) for all C ⊆ B ⊆ A in A;
(ii) p satisfies the Choice Axiom;
(iii) p is such that p (b, B) p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (b, A) for all B ⊆ A in A and
all a, b ∈ B;
(iv) p satisfies Odds Independence;
(v) p is such that p (Y ∩B,A) = p (Y,B) p (B,A) for all B ⊆ A in A and
all Y ⊆ X.
13See Kreps (1988, p. 11).
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Moreover, in this case, p satisfies Positivity if and only if it satisfies Full
Support.
Proof (i) implies (ii). Choose as C the singleton a appearing in the statement
of the axiom.
(ii) implies (iii). Given any B ⊆ A in A and any a, b ∈ B, by the Choice
Axiom, p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (B,A), but then p (b, B) p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (b, B) p (B,A) =
p (a, B) p (b, A) where the second equality follows from another application of
the Choice Axiom.
(iii) implies (iv). Let A ∈ A and arbitrarily choose a, b ∈ A such that
p (a, A) /p (b, A) 6= 0/0. By (iii),
p (b, a) p (a, A) = p (b, {a, b}) p (a, A) = p (a, {a, b}) p (b, A) = p (a, b) p (b, A)
three cases have to be considered:
• p (b, a) 6= 0 and p (b, A) 6= 0, then p (a, A) /p (b, A) = p (a, b) /p (b, a);
• p (b, a) = 0, then p (a, b) p (b, A) = 0, but p (a, b) 6= 0 (because p (a, b) /p (b, a) 6=
0/0), thus p (b, A) = 0 and p (a, A) 6= 0 (because p (a, A) /p (b, A) 6= 0/0);
therefore
p (a, b)
p (b, a)
=∞ =
p (a, A)
p (b, A)
• p (b, A) = 0, then p (b, a) p (a, A) = 0, but p (a, A) 6= 0 (because p (a, A) /p (b, A) 6=
0/0), thus p (b, a) = 0 and p (a, b) 6= 0 (because p (a, b) /p (b, a) 6= 0/0);
therefore
p (a, A)
p (b, A)
=∞ =
p (a, b)
p (b, a)
(iv) implies (iii). Given any B ⊆ A in A and any a, b ∈ B:
• If p (a, A) /p (b, A) 6= 0/0 and p (a, B) /p (b, B) 6= 0/0, then by (OI)
p (a, A)
p (b, A)
=
p (a, b)
p (b, a)
=
p (a, B)
p (b, B)
◦ If p (b, A) 6= 0, then p (b, B) 6= 0 and p (b, B) p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (b, A).
◦ Else p (b, A) = 0, then p (b, B) = 0 and again p (b, B) p (a, A) =
p (a, B) p (b, A).
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• Else, either p (a, A) /p (b, A) = 0/0 or p (a, B) /p (b, B) = 0/0, and in
both cases
p (b, B) p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (b, A)
(iii) implies (v). Given any B ⊆ A inA and any Y ⊆ X , since p (B,B) = 1,
it follows p (Y,B) = p (Y ∩ B,B). Therefore
p (Y ∩B,A) =
∑
y∈Y ∩B
p (y, A) =
∑
y∈Y ∩B
(∑
x∈B
p (x,B)
)
p (y, A) =
∑
y∈Y ∩B
(∑
x∈B
p (x,B) p (y, A)
)
[by (iii)] =
∑
y∈Y ∩B
(∑
x∈B
p (y, B) p (x,A)
)
=
∑
y∈Y ∩B
p (y, B)
(∑
x∈B
p (x,A)
)
=
∑
y∈Y ∩B
p (y, B) p (B,A) = p (Y ∩ B,B) p (B,A) = p (Y,B) p (B,A)
5 implies 1. Take Y = C.
Finally, let p satisfy the Choice Axiom. Assume – per contra – Posi-
tivity holds and p (a, A) = 0 for some A ∈ A and some a ∈ A. Then
A 6= {a} and, for all b ∈ A \ {a}, the Choice Axiom implies 0 = p (a, A) =
p (a, {a, b}) p ({a, b} , A) = p (a, b) (p (a, A) + p (b, A)) = p (a, b) p (b, A) whence
p (b, A) = 0 (because p (a, b) 6= 0), contradicting p (A,A) = 1. Therefore
Positivity implies Full Support. The converse is trivial. 
If p : A → ∆(X) is a random choice rule, denote by σp (A) the support of
pA, for all A ∈ A.
Lemma 6 If p : A → ∆(X) is a random choice rule that satisfies the Choice
Axiom, then σp : A → A is a rational choice correspondence.
Proof Clearly, ∅ 6= σp (A) ⊆ A for all A ∈ A, then σp : A → A is a
choice correspondence. Let A,B ∈ A be such that B ⊆ A and assume that
σp (A) ∩B 6= ∅.
We want to show that σp (A) ∩ B = σp (B). Since p satisfies the Choice
Axiom, if a ∈ σp (A) ∩ B, then 0 < p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (B,A). It follows that
p (a, B) > 0, that is, a ∈ σp (B). Thus, σp (A)∩B ⊆ σp (B). As to the converse
inclusion, let a ∈ σp (B), that is, p (a, B) > 0. By contradiction, assume that
a /∈ σp (A) ∩ B. Since a ∈ B, it must be the case that a /∈ σp (A), that is,
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p (a, A) = 0. Since p satisfies the Choice Axiom, we then have 0 = p (a, A) =
p (a, B) p (B,A). Since p (a, B) > 0, it must be the case that p (B,A) = 0,
that is, σp (A)∩B = ∅. This contradicts σp (A)∩B 6= ∅; therefore, a belongs
to σp (A) ∩ B. Thus, σp (B) ⊆ σp (A) ∩B. 
Lemma 7 The following conditions are equivalent for a function p : A →
∆(X):
(i) p is a random choice rule that satisfies the Choice Axiom;
(ii) p is a random choice rule such that σp is a rational choice correspondence,
and
pB (a) =
pH (a)
pH (B)
(3)
for all B ⊆ H ∈ A and all a ∈ σp (H) ∩B;
(iii) there exist a function v : X → (0,∞) and a rational choice correspon-
dence Γ : A → A such that, for all x ∈ X and A ∈ A
p (x,A) =


v (x)∑
b∈Γ(A) v (b)
if x ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
(4)
In this case, Γ is unique and coincides with σp.
Proof (iii) implies (i). Let p be given by (4) with Γ a rational choice corre-
spondence and v : X → (0,∞). It is easy to check that p is a well defined
random choice rule, that the support correspondence supp p coincides with Γ,
and that
p (Y,A) =
∑
y∈Y ∩Γ(A)
v (y)∑
d∈Γ(A) v (d)
for all Y ⊆ X and all A ∈ A.
Let A,B ∈ A be such that B ⊆ A and a ∈ B. We have two cases:
• If Γ (A) ∩ B 6= ∅, since Γ satisfies WARP, Γ (A) ∩B = Γ (B).
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◦ If a ∈ Γ (B), then a ∈ Γ (A) and p (a, B) = v (a) /
∑
b∈Γ(B) v (b), it
follows that
p (a, A) =
v (a)∑
d∈Γ(A) v (d)
=
v (a)∑
b∈Γ(B) v (b)
∑
b∈Γ(A)∩B v (b)∑
d∈Γ(A) v (d)
= p (a, B) p (B,A)
◦ Else a /∈ Γ (B), and since a ∈ B, it must be the case that a /∈ Γ (A),
so p (a, A) = 0 = p (a, B) = p (a, B) p (B,A).
• Else Γ (A)∩B = ∅. It follows that a /∈ Γ (A) and p (B,A) = 0 = p (a, A);
again, we have p (a, A) = p (a, B) p (B,A).
These cases prove that p satisfies the Choice Axiom.
(i) implies (ii). Let p : A → ∆(X) be a random choice rule that satisfies
the Choice Axiom. Then, by Lemma 6, σp : A → A is a rational choice
correspondence. Moreover, if B ⊆ H and all a ∈ σp (H) ∩B, then
p (a,H) = p (a, B) p (B,H)
but p (B,H) ≥ p (a,H) > 0 because a ∈ B and a ∈ σp (H), and (3) follows.
(ii) implies (iii). Let p : A → ∆(X) be a random choice rule such that
σp is a rational choice correspondence, and that satisfies (3). Since, σp is a
rational choice correspondence, then the relation
a % b ⇐⇒ a ∈ σp ({a, b}) ⇐⇒ p (a, b) > 0
is a weak order on X ; and its symmetric part ∼ is an equivalence relation such
that
a ∼ b ⇐⇒ p (a, b) > 0 and p (b, a) > 0 ⇐⇒ r (a, b) ∈ (0,∞)
Moreover, by Theorem 3 of Arrow (1959), it follows that
σp (A) = {a ∈ A : a % b ∀b ∈ A} ∀A ∈ A (5)
in particular, all elements of σp (A) are equivalent with respect to ∼, and
σp (S) = S (6)
for all S ∈ A consisting of equivalent elements.
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Let {Xi : i ∈ I} be the family of all equivalence classes of ∼ in X . Choose
ai ∈ Xi for all i ∈ I. For each x ∈ X , there exists one and only one i = ix
such that x ∈ Xi, set
v (x) = r (x, ai) (7)
Since x ∼ ai, then r (x, ai) ∈ (0,∞); and so v : X → (0,∞) is well defined.
Consider any x ∼ y in X and any S ∈ A consisting of equivalent elements and
containing x and y. Notice that, by (6), σp (S) = S, hence x ∈ σp (S)∩ {x, y},
then by (3) with H = S and B = {x, y},
p (x, y) =
pS (x)
pS ({x, y})
therefore
0 < p (x, S) = p (x, y) p ({x, y} , S)
and analogously
0 < p (y, S) = p (y, x) p ({x, y} , S)
yielding that
p (x, y) p (y, x) p (x, S) p (y, S) > 0 and
p (x, S)
p (y, S)
=
p (x, y)
p (y, x)
= r (x, y) (8)
We are ready to conclude our proof, that is, to show that (4) holds with
Γ = σp. Let a ∈ X and A ∈ A. If a /∈ σp (A), then p (a, A) = 0 because σp (A)
is the support of pA. Else, a ∈ σp (A), and, by (5), all the elements in σp (A)
are equivalent with respect to ∼ and therefore they are equivalent to some ai
with i ∈ I. It follows that σp (A) ∪ {ai} ∈ A and it is such that σp (A) ∪
{ai} ⊆ Xi. By (6), we have that σp (σp (A) ∪ {ai}) = σp (A) ∪ {ai}, that is,
p (x, σp (A) ∪ {ai}) > 0 for all x ∈ σp (A)∪{ai} and p (σp (A) , σp (A) ∪ {ai}) >
0. By (3) with H = A and B = σp (A), since a ∈ σp (A) ∩ B, it follows
p (a, σp (A)) =
p (a, A)
p (σp (A) , A)
Since p (σp (A) , A) = 1, then
p (a, A) = p (a, σp (A))
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By (3) again, withH = σp (A)∪{ai} andB = σp (A), since a ∈ σp (σp (A) ∪ {ai})∩
σp (A), then
p (a, σp (A)) =
p (a, σp (A) ∪ {ai})
p (σp (A) , σp (A) ∪ {ai})
=
p(a,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(σp(A),σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})
applying (8) to the pairs (x, y) = (a, ai) and (x, y) = (b, ai), with b ∈ σp (A),
in S = σp (A) ∪ {ai} ⊆ Xi, we can conclude that
p(a,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(σp(A),σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})
=
p(a,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})∑
b∈σp(A)
p(b,σp(A)∪{ai})
p(ai,σp(A)∪{ai})
=
r (a, ai)∑
b∈σp(A)
r (b, ai)
=
v (a)∑
b∈σp(A)
v (b)
as wanted.
As for the uniqueness part, we already observed that (iii) implies Γ = σp.

Theorem 2 immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 3 In Theorem 2, Γ is a rational choice correspondence
and the corresponding weak order is
a % b ⇐⇒ a ∈ Γ ({a, b}) ⇐⇒ p (a, b) > 0
thus Continuity can be rewritten as: Given any x, y ∈ X , if {xn}n∈N converges
to x, then
xn % y for all n ∈ N =⇒ x % y
y % xn for all n ∈ N =⇒ y % x
This concludes the proof, because on a separable metric space, a weak order
admits a continuous utility if and only if its upper and lower level sets are
closed (see, e.g., Kreps, 1988, p. 27). 
The set W of all weak orders on X is endowed with the σ-algebra W
generated by the sets of the form
Wab = {≻ : a ≻ b} ∀a, b ∈ X
Given ≻ and ≻′ in W, the lexicographic composition ≻ ◦ ≻′ of ≻ and ≻′
is routinely seen to be a weak order too (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1974).
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Lemma 8 For each ≻ in W, the map
f = f≻ : W → W
≻′ 7→ ≻ ◦ ≻′
is measurable with respect to W.
Proof Arbitrarily choose a, b ∈ X , and study
f−1 (Wab) = f
−1 ({≻′′ : a ≻′′ b}) = {≻′ : f (≻′) ∈ {≻′′ : a ≻′′ b}}
= {≻′ : a f (≻′) b} = {≻′ : a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b}
• if a ≺ b, then there is no ≻′ in W such that a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b, that is,
{≻′ : a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b} = ∅
which is measurable (because ∅ ∈W),
• else if a ≻ b, then a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b for all ≻′ in W, that is,
{≻′ : a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b} =W
which is measurable (because W ∈W),
• else, it must be the case that a ∼ b and a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b if and only if a ≻′ b,
that is,
{≻′ : a ≻ ◦ ≻′ b} = {≻′ : a ≻′ b} = Wab
which is measurable (because Wab ∈W).
Therefore f is measurable since the counterimage of a class of generators
of W is contained in W. 
A Random Preference Model is a measurable function
P : (Ω,F ,Pr) → W
ω 7→ P (ω)
It is common practice to write ≻ω instead of P (ω). The Random Selector p
based on the RPM P is given by
p (a, A) = Pr (ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ω b ∀b ∈ A \ {a}) ∀a ∈ A ∈ A
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The latter is well defined because
{ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ω b ∀b ∈ A \ {a}} = {ω ∈ Ω : P (ω) ∈ Wab ∀b ∈ A \ {a}}
=
{
ω ∈ Ω : P (ω) ∈
⋂
b∈A\{a}
Wab
}
= P−1
(⋂
b∈A\{a}
Wab
)
∈ F
since P is measurable. Moreover, depending on P , the RS p might not define
a random choice rule. For instance, if P is constantly equal to the trivial weak
order according to which all alternatives are indifferent, then p (a, A) = 0 for
all a ∈ A ∈ A such that |A| ≥ 2.
The proof of Proposition 4 hinges on the study of the composition of the
functions f≻ and P .
First, such a composition defines a random preference model, because
f≻ ◦ P : (Ω,F ,Pr) → W
ω 7→ f≻ (P (ω)) = ≻ ◦ ≻ω
—being a composition of measurable functions, it is measurable.
Second, the random selector based on the random preference model f≻ ◦P
is a lexicographic version of P , that first selects the maximizers of ≻, then
breaks the ties according to P .
In order to state these results formally, we denote by Γ = Γ≻ the rational
choice correspondence induced by ≻.14
Lemma 9 Let ≻ be a weak order, P = {≻ω}ω∈Ω be a RPM, and p be the RS
based on P . Then f≻ ◦ P = {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈Ω is a RPM and the RS based on it is
given by
p≻ (a, A) =
{
p (a,Γ (A)) if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
(9)
for all a ∈ A ∈ A.
Proof We already observed that f≻ ◦ P = {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈Ω is a RPM. By defini-
tion of random selector based on a RPM
p≻ (a, A) = Pr (ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b ∀b ∈ A \ {a})
14Γ≻ (A) = {a ∈ A : a % b for all b ∈ A} also recall that a % b if and only if a ⊀ b.
19
We have to verify that this formula coincides with (9) for all a ∈ A ∈ A.
For each A ∈ A and each a ∈ Γ (A), set
JA (a) = {ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ω c for all c ∈ Γ (A) \ {a}} = J
KA (a) = {ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b for all b ∈ A \ {a}} = K
Next we check that J = K.
If ω ∈ J , then a ≻ω c for all c ∈ Γ (A) \ {a}; take any b ∈ A \ {a},
• if b is such that b /∈ Γ (A), then, a ≻ b and hence a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b,
• else b ∈ Γ (A), then a ∼ b and a ≻ω b, again a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b,
then a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b for all b ∈ A \ {a}, thus ω ∈ K.
Conversely, if ω ∈ K, then a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b for all b ∈ A \ {a}. Thus, for all
b ∈ Γ (A)\{a}, since relation a ∼ b, it must be the case that a ≻ω b. Therefore
ω is such that a ≻ω b for all b ∈ Γ (A) \ {a}, and ω ∈ J .
Summing up, for all A ∈ A and a ∈ Γ (A),
p (a,Γ (A)) = Pr JA (a) = PrKA (a) = p≻ (a, A)
and the first line of (9) is true.
Let A ∈ A and a /∈ Γ (A), then there exists b¯ ∈ A \ {a} such that a ≺ b¯,
and for no ω it holds a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b¯, that is,
KA (a) = {ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ ◦ ≻ω b for all b ∈ A \ {a}} = ∅
therefore p≻ (a, A) = PrKA (a) = 0, and the second line of (9) is true too. 
Proof of Proposition 4 The equivalence between points (i) and (ii) corre-
sponds with the equivalence between the points with the same name of Lemma
7.
(i) implies (iii). By Theorem 2, there exist a function α : X → R and a
rational choice correspondence Γ : A → A such that
p (a, A) =


eα(a)∑
b∈Γ(A) e
α(b)
if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
for all a ∈ A ∈ A. Denote by ≻ the weak order that corresponds to Γ.
As shown by McFadden (1973), the Lucean random choice rule
q (a, A) =
eα(a)∑
b∈A e
α(b)
∀a ∈ A ∈ A
is based on a (Lucean) RPM P = {≻ω}ω∈Ω. By Lemma 9, it follows that
f≻ ◦ P = {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈Ω is a RPM and the RS based on it is given by
q≻ (a, A) =
{
q (a,Γ (A)) if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
= p (a, A) ∀a ∈ A ∈ A
Therefore, there exist a Lucean Random Preference Model {≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr) and
a weak order ≻ on X such that p is based on {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr).
(iii) implies (i). If there exist a Lucean Random Preference Model {≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr)
and a weak order ≻ on X such that p is based on {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr); in par-
ticular, there exists α : X → R such that
Pr (ω ∈ Ω : a ≻ω b ∀b ∈ A \ {a}) =
eα(a)∑
b∈A e
α(b)
∀a ∈ A ∈ A
Denoting
q (a, A) =
eα(a)∑
b∈A e
α(b)
∀a ∈ A ∈ A
the RS based on {≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr), by Lemma 9, the RS is based on {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr)
is
q≻ (a, A) =
{
q (a,Γ (A)) if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
=


eα(a)∑
b∈Γ(A) e
α(b)
if a ∈ Γ (A)
0 else
But, by assumption (iii), q≻ coincides with p (p is based on {≻ ◦ ≻ω}ω∈(Ω,F ,Pr)),
and Γ is a rational choice correspondence because ≻ is a weak order. Then
Theorem 2 guarantees that p satisfies the Choice Axiom. 
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